I generally support all the thoughts expressed, and I appreciate the reminder about 1973 (I had completely forgotten about the pressure on Israel to let the Egyptian forces escape).
Unlike, for example, 1973 in Sinai and the Golan, the "we" related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine is rather more diffuse/inchoate - I don't recall the details of how much, if at all, Nixon and Kissinger coordinated with the UK, let alone France, Germany, etc. regarding the messaging back and forth with the USSR. There is a lot more cat herding involved here, plus the economic pain of extending the present grind through this winter is far more concentrated for Europe than it is for the US.
I have one minor pushback, though, regarding "this war is proof that the rules-based order, such as it was, is no longer operative". The rule-based order at any given time is sort of Heisenbergian - the act of discovering the rules (usually by one actor testing the limits) tends to change what the rules are, but there are lots of hidden (and changing) state variables whose values we can only guess at.
Excellent questions posed...even if you understandably don't venture an answer.
You write
"The hostile yet cautious and incremental Russia that seized Crimea and was fighting a low-intensity war in the Donbas was a problem for America, but not a catastrophe. The Russia that has been revealed by the war in Ukraine is more like a catastrophe. So what we’re fighting for, ultimately, is a change in Russia. But is it a change in regime?"
The above-quoted text contains the kernels of an answer.
Number one, it is dangerous in the extreme if we want to de-escalate expressly to couch what "we" want as "a change in Russia." That just plays into Putin's narrative of victimization, which finds fertile soil in the Russian psyche given its history since Napoleon through the Third Reich. Of course, we all want a change in Russia, but saying so out loud will have precisely the opposite effect.
So, the off-ramp has to be a return to some status quo ante in Ukraine. But has of when? February 23, 2022? Pre-2014? Ukraine (or at least Zelensky) clearly envisions the latter, but should the West bet the farm on whatever Ukraine wants? Again, that is not a realistic path to de-escalation. As you point out, that is treating Ukraine functionally as if were already a NATO member.
You also point out that the status quo ante as of February 23, 2022 was a "problem" for the West, but not a "catastrophe." I agree. There has to be an armistice at some point that will inevitably put into place a far from satisfactory status quo while efforts are made to bring the temperature down and get the Russian military out of as much of Ukraine as possible. We just need to buy time.
Ideally, a settlement would result ultimately in something like internationally supervised referenda in the Eastern provinces. But that's a long shot.
Ultimately, any realistic off-ramp will be something that nobody likes, but everybody can tolerate for the time being.
I generally support all the thoughts expressed, and I appreciate the reminder about 1973 (I had completely forgotten about the pressure on Israel to let the Egyptian forces escape).
Unlike, for example, 1973 in Sinai and the Golan, the "we" related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine is rather more diffuse/inchoate - I don't recall the details of how much, if at all, Nixon and Kissinger coordinated with the UK, let alone France, Germany, etc. regarding the messaging back and forth with the USSR. There is a lot more cat herding involved here, plus the economic pain of extending the present grind through this winter is far more concentrated for Europe than it is for the US.
I have one minor pushback, though, regarding "this war is proof that the rules-based order, such as it was, is no longer operative". The rule-based order at any given time is sort of Heisenbergian - the act of discovering the rules (usually by one actor testing the limits) tends to change what the rules are, but there are lots of hidden (and changing) state variables whose values we can only guess at.
Excellent questions posed...even if you understandably don't venture an answer.
You write
"The hostile yet cautious and incremental Russia that seized Crimea and was fighting a low-intensity war in the Donbas was a problem for America, but not a catastrophe. The Russia that has been revealed by the war in Ukraine is more like a catastrophe. So what we’re fighting for, ultimately, is a change in Russia. But is it a change in regime?"
The above-quoted text contains the kernels of an answer.
Number one, it is dangerous in the extreme if we want to de-escalate expressly to couch what "we" want as "a change in Russia." That just plays into Putin's narrative of victimization, which finds fertile soil in the Russian psyche given its history since Napoleon through the Third Reich. Of course, we all want a change in Russia, but saying so out loud will have precisely the opposite effect.
So, the off-ramp has to be a return to some status quo ante in Ukraine. But has of when? February 23, 2022? Pre-2014? Ukraine (or at least Zelensky) clearly envisions the latter, but should the West bet the farm on whatever Ukraine wants? Again, that is not a realistic path to de-escalation. As you point out, that is treating Ukraine functionally as if were already a NATO member.
You also point out that the status quo ante as of February 23, 2022 was a "problem" for the West, but not a "catastrophe." I agree. There has to be an armistice at some point that will inevitably put into place a far from satisfactory status quo while efforts are made to bring the temperature down and get the Russian military out of as much of Ukraine as possible. We just need to buy time.
Ideally, a settlement would result ultimately in something like internationally supervised referenda in the Eastern provinces. But that's a long shot.
Ultimately, any realistic off-ramp will be something that nobody likes, but everybody can tolerate for the time being.