I don't think Power's position re Libya or Fischer's re Kosovo had anything to do with grand strategy. Neither Libya nor Kosovo had strategic significance. (Proof--we easily let Libya descend into chaos.) They were making humanitarian pleas--remember Qaddafi announced that he was about to commit genocide, and the threat seemed plausible. I remember being in a Berlin crowd when Fischer made his case on the basis of "nie wieder" (never again). Grand strategy of the Kissingerian sort seems premised on the notion that any possible idealism can only stem from realism. It doesn't mean being pro-intervention--Morgenthau was of the same mind as Kissinger in these matters and he was against intervening in Vietnam. (According to Niall Ferguson in his Kissinger bio, Kissinger knew Vietnam was a terrible idea too--he just lost his nerve and went along.) Detente was good grand strategy. The second Iraq war was terrible grand strategy. The question is not about whether to go to war.
As for the need for a grand strategy program, remember that diplomatic history, like military history, is almost completely neglected in history departments these days. Most history departments don't have anyone who studies the subject. Political science is about either statistics or classics of political theory. But it's very hard to understand twentieth century history without at least something of Gaddis-style grand strategy study--the way in which the Cold War, for example, was in part about client states manipulating superpowers. Without this perspective, historians tend to fall into lazy Marxist clichés of the kind that now seem to dominate the academy.
And by the way, Howard just got $140 million of donations in the first half of this year alone. Since they've abolished their classics department, it's unlikely they'd accept a donation for a grand strategy program.
I love the Edwin Starr shout out. And you're absolutely right to put the Yale controversy in the context of l'affaire Bass.
Yeah, I think you may have misunderstood my point. I wasn't implying that Fischer or Power were pursuing any notion of "grand strategy" when they advocated for their respective wars. I was saying that (a) having either a humanitarian or radical leftist background doesn't keep you from advocating for destructive wars when you are in power, and (b) power politics affects how those supposedly humanitarian wars will be perceived in the world, and therefore how they will affect the world. So grand strategy is important to understand *even if* you ultimately want to bend power towards the ends of justice. "Fight for the good guys" isn't going to be an effective strategy *on its own terms* quite apart from whether it's also a bad strategy seen through the lens of the national interest.
I think it's worth saving realism from the modifier "Kissingerian" since Kissinger's actual record can be persuasively attacked for being at least as much about advancing his own career and/or protecting the interests of the political leaders he served as it was about husbanding American power and advancing American interests. Indeed, what you say about Vietnam highlights what's wrong with holding up Kissinger as the exemplar of realism in foreign policy. Kissinger supported the Iraq War too, and I suspect from very similar motives: he knew what those in power wanted, and he wasn't going to risk his position by critiquing it.
As for giving money to Howard, I was being glib, but also serious in that I really do think it's bad for America for us to pull so much of its leadership class from a tiny group of schools. This is not really a point about left-wing bias; check out how many leading conservatives went to the same schools. It's a point about insularity. So yeah, if I wanted to fund a program in grand strategy, I'd look to elevate an institution that drew from a population that isn't so well-represented at our top-tier schools. If you're fundamentally teaching common sense (as the remit for the Yale program suggested), why does it need to be taught only to the most elite of the elite?
You're right, I did misunderstand you--sorry! Not sure why I mentioned Kissinger (because you did?), but I couldn't agree more that his legacy is very badly contaminated by going along with those in power, in the cases of Vietnam and the Second Iraq War and a few others too. (And he began his career by writing a book about "limited" nuclear war in which he conveniently forgot to mention the long-term effects of radiation!) But then there's another side, the opening to Russia and China...In any event, the point you make is absolutely right--humanitarian interventions have effects that can only be calculated from a grand strategy perspective. Some of these effects might be disruptions to world or regional order that sooner or later lead to more humanitarian disaster along with other forms of damage. In the case of Kosovo costs were correctly calculated; in Libya they weren't. The notion that we should have "stayed in" Libya and established security there after Qaddafi doesn't seem viable--I'd like to hear a convincing case for how that could have been done, but I haven't.
"bad donor management" would seem to be correct. As a public-univeristy professor who has steered several 7-figure donations (in STEM), the Yale admin strikes me as grossly and shockingly incompetent (if reporting that I have read is accurate). In particular, the original gift agreement apparently called for the setting up of an advisory board (a very good idea in any case), and this was apparently never done. The details of how this board was to function (most importantly, how it's members were to be chosen, and what qualifications they needed to have, and what its powers were) should also have been spelled out. Then, when years later the donors complain about whatever, Yale just says "we're following the agreement we set up".
I don't think Power's position re Libya or Fischer's re Kosovo had anything to do with grand strategy. Neither Libya nor Kosovo had strategic significance. (Proof--we easily let Libya descend into chaos.) They were making humanitarian pleas--remember Qaddafi announced that he was about to commit genocide, and the threat seemed plausible. I remember being in a Berlin crowd when Fischer made his case on the basis of "nie wieder" (never again). Grand strategy of the Kissingerian sort seems premised on the notion that any possible idealism can only stem from realism. It doesn't mean being pro-intervention--Morgenthau was of the same mind as Kissinger in these matters and he was against intervening in Vietnam. (According to Niall Ferguson in his Kissinger bio, Kissinger knew Vietnam was a terrible idea too--he just lost his nerve and went along.) Detente was good grand strategy. The second Iraq war was terrible grand strategy. The question is not about whether to go to war.
As for the need for a grand strategy program, remember that diplomatic history, like military history, is almost completely neglected in history departments these days. Most history departments don't have anyone who studies the subject. Political science is about either statistics or classics of political theory. But it's very hard to understand twentieth century history without at least something of Gaddis-style grand strategy study--the way in which the Cold War, for example, was in part about client states manipulating superpowers. Without this perspective, historians tend to fall into lazy Marxist clichés of the kind that now seem to dominate the academy.
And by the way, Howard just got $140 million of donations in the first half of this year alone. Since they've abolished their classics department, it's unlikely they'd accept a donation for a grand strategy program.
I love the Edwin Starr shout out. And you're absolutely right to put the Yale controversy in the context of l'affaire Bass.
Yeah, I think you may have misunderstood my point. I wasn't implying that Fischer or Power were pursuing any notion of "grand strategy" when they advocated for their respective wars. I was saying that (a) having either a humanitarian or radical leftist background doesn't keep you from advocating for destructive wars when you are in power, and (b) power politics affects how those supposedly humanitarian wars will be perceived in the world, and therefore how they will affect the world. So grand strategy is important to understand *even if* you ultimately want to bend power towards the ends of justice. "Fight for the good guys" isn't going to be an effective strategy *on its own terms* quite apart from whether it's also a bad strategy seen through the lens of the national interest.
I think it's worth saving realism from the modifier "Kissingerian" since Kissinger's actual record can be persuasively attacked for being at least as much about advancing his own career and/or protecting the interests of the political leaders he served as it was about husbanding American power and advancing American interests. Indeed, what you say about Vietnam highlights what's wrong with holding up Kissinger as the exemplar of realism in foreign policy. Kissinger supported the Iraq War too, and I suspect from very similar motives: he knew what those in power wanted, and he wasn't going to risk his position by critiquing it.
As for giving money to Howard, I was being glib, but also serious in that I really do think it's bad for America for us to pull so much of its leadership class from a tiny group of schools. This is not really a point about left-wing bias; check out how many leading conservatives went to the same schools. It's a point about insularity. So yeah, if I wanted to fund a program in grand strategy, I'd look to elevate an institution that drew from a population that isn't so well-represented at our top-tier schools. If you're fundamentally teaching common sense (as the remit for the Yale program suggested), why does it need to be taught only to the most elite of the elite?
You're right, I did misunderstand you--sorry! Not sure why I mentioned Kissinger (because you did?), but I couldn't agree more that his legacy is very badly contaminated by going along with those in power, in the cases of Vietnam and the Second Iraq War and a few others too. (And he began his career by writing a book about "limited" nuclear war in which he conveniently forgot to mention the long-term effects of radiation!) But then there's another side, the opening to Russia and China...In any event, the point you make is absolutely right--humanitarian interventions have effects that can only be calculated from a grand strategy perspective. Some of these effects might be disruptions to world or regional order that sooner or later lead to more humanitarian disaster along with other forms of damage. In the case of Kosovo costs were correctly calculated; in Libya they weren't. The notion that we should have "stayed in" Libya and established security there after Qaddafi doesn't seem viable--I'd like to hear a convincing case for how that could have been done, but I haven't.
"bad donor management" would seem to be correct. As a public-univeristy professor who has steered several 7-figure donations (in STEM), the Yale admin strikes me as grossly and shockingly incompetent (if reporting that I have read is accurate). In particular, the original gift agreement apparently called for the setting up of an advisory board (a very good idea in any case), and this was apparently never done. The details of how this board was to function (most importantly, how it's members were to be chosen, and what qualifications they needed to have, and what its powers were) should also have been spelled out. Then, when years later the donors complain about whatever, Yale just says "we're following the agreement we set up".